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This paper studies the relation between the government and the non-profit
organization from an agency theoretic perspective. Contracting out the production
to the non-profit organ'vation, makes it necessary to the government to provide
incentives For the non-profit organization to make choices which will maximize the
government's utility. The agency theory stresses the role of the budget structure in
the relation between these two parties. The consequences of diffcrent forms of
budgeting to the maximization process of the government are both described and
modelled. The latter is done by postulating an utility function for the government.
The optimization of this utility function, subjeU to the utility function of the
bureaucrats of the noo-profit organization, will be s[udied both for the case in
which the government has perfect foresight, as well as the case in which the
governmeot has imperfect foresight.
~ The author thanks Prof. Dr. R. Bannink, Prof. Dr. W. van Hulst, Drs. M. Tummers and Drs. P. Adang
for their stimulating discussions and useful comments.
" This paper óas been prepared for presentation at the 'Secand Warfd Cartgn..u an Ktallh Economics",
Zurich, Sept. 10-14, 1990.
1. Introduction
In some situations, the government intervenes in the market process by partially or
fully financing the production process. The primary goal of this intervention is to
attain a socially more acceptable equilíbrium of supply and demand. This paper
tries to solve the problem of optimal financing by the government of the particular
non-profit organizations involved in this government activity. Based on an agency-
theoretic approach, the different forms in which the production can be financed
are compared. In section 2, the theory of "Welfare Economics" is enunciated which
results in a social welfare function, as formulated in section 3. Economic models
of behaviour are presented in section 4. The models of I~liskanen, Williamson and
of Mique 8c Belanger imply an utility function of the bureaucrats of the non-profit
organization. Section 5 reflects the agency theory, which stresses the importance of
the role of budgeting in the relation government vs. non-profit organization. The
consequences of different forms of budgeting to the maximization process of the
government are described in section 6 and 7. In section 6, the government is
assumed to have perfect information at the cost function of the non-profit
organization as well as on the utility function of the bureaucrats, whereas in
section 7 the government is assumed to be confronted with uncertainty with
respect to these functions. The presentation of the model which represents these
theories and tries to optimize the utility function of the government is made in
section 8, whereas the results of uncertainty to the decision making process are
studied in section 9. Finally, the conclusions are presented in the section 10.
2. Welfare Economics
The theories that are concerned with microeconomic analysis of govermental
intervention in the market process and relevant to this study, are the 'Theory of
Public Finance" and the 'Theory of Welfare Economics". The 'Theory of Public
Finance" examines simultaneously the optimal size and composition of the public
funds. As this theory uses the concept of social welfare, this "concept" has to be
defined. Analyses concerning this problem relate to the theory of "Welfare




In Pigou's analysis, the social welfare is equal to the sum of individual utilities:
W- ul f uZ f.... f uh~ f uo
with: W - Social Welfare
u' - Utility of individual i
n - Number of individuals
(1)
Pigou's work is based on the conceptions that individual utility is measurable and
that an intersubjective comparison of these individual utilities is possible. The
ordinality of utility and the impossibilty of the interpersonal comparison of these
utility measurements are serious drawbacks of this approach. Therefore, other
alternatives were developped.
Theory of P~eto
In Pareto's view, an allocation X is Pareto efficient if there is no feasible
allocation X' such that all agents prefer X' to X. An alternative formulation of
Pareto efficiency is: 'There is no feasible allocation where everyone is at least as
well off, and at least one agent is strictly better off'. Social welfare is no longer
equal to the sum of individual utilities, but is a more general function of the
welfare of the individual subjects:
W - f(u~,uZ,....,uRi ,u„) (2)
A well-known disadvantage of the Pareto criterium is the impossibility of making a
trade-off between efficiency and equity. Pareto efficient outcomes excludes
departures from distributional equity. Therefore, the problem is that this approach
generates a lot of Pareto optima in stead of one.
Theory of Bergson
In contrast to the concept of the Pigovian and the Paretian social welfare
functions, which are based on the individual utility functions, the theory of Bergson
makes use of a collective subject (usually the government) with a collective social
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welfare function. Elements like external effects are incorperated in Bergson's
welfare functions. Usually, it is hard to specify this function.
In this paper, we study the relation between the govemment and a single non-
profit organization. We are more interested in the process of attaining the social
welfare optimum then in the exart determination of this optimum. Therefore, it
seems reasonable to choose the theory of Bergson which is the most suited for this
approach. Thus, an utility funtion of the goverment will be defined.
3. Utility function of the Government
3.1. Introduction
Before defining the government's utility function, it is necessary to stress the
limitations of this study. First of all, we examine the relation between government
and non-profit organization in a microeconomic context. Macroeconomic aspects
like inflation and unemployment are left out. Secondly, the relation will be restric-
ted to the government vs. one non-profit organization (e.g. a hospital) in one
sector of the non-profit economy (for example "Health Care"). Competition
between non-profit organizations is therefore impossible. Thirdly, both government
and non-profit organization are not organizations with multiple individuals with
their own objectives, but they will act as one person with one overall objective.
And last but not least, the government has perfect foresight. Later however, this
last assumption will be released.
3.2. Modelling Government's Behaviour
In order to determine an utility function of the government, we assume that the
government óeiiaves as follows. Firstly, the govemment assesses her total tax
income (public funds), which she allocates to the several departments. We assume
that these departments are "ezpense centers", which have as their main objective to
maximize their specific goal witkout e:rceedi~g their total budget.
In order to model this, we assume that a department produces two goods, xi en x2,
which both are arguments of a concave utility function. Now it is possíble to
construct the indifference curves of [xl ,xZ ] each of which, as is well-known,
represent all combinations of the goods with the same utility. In the same way, we
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can determine the total cost of each combination of both goods. Analogous to the
determination of the iso-utility-curves, we can derive iso-costs-curves, each of
which represent the combinations [xt ,x2 J with the same total costs to the
governmentl. Figure 1 shows the indifference curves, each of which have a point of
tangency with the corresponding iso-costs-curves.
x:
x,
Figure 1: Determination of the optimal allocation path
These points of tangency are optimal to the government, in the sense that each
point gives the government the highest utility given some cost-level, or, the other
way round, the lowest cost given a certain level of utility. By connecting these
points of tangency, we get a path which represents the set of all possible efficient
allocations by the government. Figure 1 shows this path, which is called the
"optimal allocation path". Given the budget volume of the department, it is easy to
determine the optimal mix [xt ,x2 J. But if we compare this strategy with the
functioning of the mazket mechanism, this strategy is suboptimal because "marginal
cost" and "marginal profits" are not weight one against another. The government
ignores these optimality rules in the budget sector.
' In the remainder of this study, the term government is used in stead of department. While, as




In this section we specify the utility function of the govemment. This specification
is based on the theoretical remarks, mentioned in section 2, and the observations
of section 3.2. Based on this observed behaviour, the theory of welfare economics
and the familiar utility theory, we can describe a sector bounded method which
guarantees the most optimal government spending.
In stead of the utility function of section 3.2., we assume an utility function with a
positive and a negative part to ensure that "marginal cost" and "marginal profits"
are weight against another. The positive part, or U', is determined by the
valuation of the output of the sector, whereas the negative part, or U; is described
by the budget which is necessary to produce the output. Figure 2 gives the
relations between the relevant variables as well as the corresponding equilibrium








Figure 2: Equilibrium in the budget sector
Firs7 9uad~~rt (toP rtght)
This quadrant describes the relation between the size of the budget and the
produced output by the non-profit organization. This relation is not equal to the
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way in which the government allocates the budget to the non-profit orgaruzation.
Different kinds of inefficiencties are responsible for the difference between these
two concepts. Even if the government has perfect foresight, the non-profit
organization has the power to create some "slack" which can be used for own
objectives. Because of the opportunity costs of the government? the non-profit
organization is able to produce above the minimum necessary costs. If we define
"efficiency" as the minimum necessary costs of production, then it is clear that
delegation of the production to the non-profit organization causes inefficiency,
even if the government has perfect foresight. In a later section, we shall prove that
the structure of the budget is responsible for the level of this inefficiency.
seco,~d yundrm~r (rop !eh)
The second quadrant specifies the positive part of the utility funtion (U'). This
part is determined by the governments valuation of the output. This utility function
is specified to be concave and increasing in its argument. Given this utilitty
function, we can straightforward derive the marginal utility function (dU'), which
is shown in the second quadrant of figure 2.
7Twd quadrmtt (down !eh)
This quadrant simply specifies the optimality condition. The equilibrium situation
will be reached only if the marginal utility of output (second quadrant) and the
marginal disutility of the budget (fourth quadrant) are equal. This condition is
represented by the 45oline.
Fouith quadim~t (down right)
The production of output by the non-profit organization is only possible if the
government gives the non-profit organization a budget. This budget is formed by
the tax payments of the citizens, which cause a disutility to the citizens and
therefore to the government3 Based on the Engel C~tve, which assumes a positive
concave relatíon between consumption and income, and the assumption that
~ The opportunity costs are the costs of production by the government itself.
' We assume that:
(a) The total tax payments are equal ro the allocated budget.
(b) The u[ility function of the government represents perfectly the preferences of the citizens.
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higher tax payments imply less private constunption, the relation between the
disutility (U') and the tax payment is assumed to be convex and increasing in iu
argument. Higher tax payments cause a higher disutility, and this relation is
assumed to be progressive. Given these relations, it is easy to derive the marginal
disutility function (dU") drawn in the fourth quadrant.
Eqtulibrtwn
The unique equilibrium in figure 2 is given by the quantities corresponding to the
corners of the dotted rectangle. Only at these points and in this combination, the
equilibrium is reached. This model guarantees that the government can simul-
taneously determine the optimal volume of both output and budget.
4. Economic Models of Bureaucracy
Market imperfections often result in an intervention by the government. If the
government contracts out the production, she usually does this within the budget-
sector. But Wolf (1988) shows that there are also "non-market failures". One of
the main causes of these non-market failures is the discrepancy between the
objective(s) of the government itself, and the objective(s) of the management' of
the non-profit organization. Even if it is possible to determine perfectly the
optimal output and budget of a sector, this discrepancy causes imperfections. As a
consequence of the own objectives of the management of the non-profit organiza-
tion, there is a bandwidth in which output and budget move.
4.1. Modelling Bureaucrats Behaviour
Models concerning the behaviour of those who manage public agencies, and in our
case more specifically non-profit organizations, have been developed by many
economists. A lot of economic models of bureaucracy that provide an alternative
to the traditional profit maximization models used the utility maximization hypo-
thesis. The best-known contributions in this field are the utility maximization
models of Williamson (1964) and Niskanen (1971). This last model has been modi-
fied by Migue and Belanger (1971). In this section we will discuss these three
` fn this paper managers and bureauaats are synonyms.
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models in order to obtain a specific utility function of the bureaucrats of the non-
profit organization.
77te Nerícmten Model
Niskanen assumes that bureaucrau will maYimi~p the budget of their organization
because all arguments of their utility function are an increasing function of this
budget volume. He says:
'Among the several variables that may enter the buroaucrat's utility function are
the following: salary, perquisites of the o8'ice, public regulation, power,
partronage. output of the bureau, ease of maJcing cbanges, and ease of managing
tbe bureau. All of thcse variables ezcept the last two, I contend, arc a positive
monotonic function of the total budget of the bureau" ( Niskanen, 1971, p. 38).
Because the bureaucrats are not confronted with the marginal costs of budget
growth, output will be produced until the "marginal profits" are zero.
Consequently, the non-profit organization will produce an output level which is
beyond the social optimum. Niskanen further assumes that the process will be
e~cient, that is production at minimum costs:
"... cost-output production ..... represeots the minimum total payment to factors
necessary to produce a given output, given the factor prices and available
production processes; the cost-output function represents the relation among
these points" ( Niskanen, 1971, p. 31-32).
To summarize, Niskanen assumes that output will be produced at minimum costs
and that the utility function of the bureaucrats results in the ambition towards the
highest possible budget which, as we shall see by Mique 8c Belanger, is equi-
valent to output maximization. So, the utility maximizing problem of the
bureaucrat of the non-profit organization can be represented as follow:
Max V~ - Max V~(B) - Max V~(q) (3)
where
V~- Utility of the bureaucrat in Niskanen's model
B- Budget of the non-profit organization
q- output of the non-profit organization
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7be Willimnson Model
Firstly, Williamson assumes that both managers of the neoclassical firm and the
bureaucrats have an"expense preference" which results in costs of production that
are much higher then the minimum costs. As a result of the "non-distribution
constraint" of the non-profit organization, the bureaucrats are not able to pay
themselves the difference between the minimum costs and the revenues.
Therefore, the managers will indirectly profit by producing the output above
minimum costs. The difference between the budget and the minimum costs will be
used for their own benefit. William.son asstunes that "expenses for the staff
function" is the most important manner to maximize the utility function of the
bureaucrats, because of the positive relation of staff with elements like salary,
status, power and security. In his model the staff expenses are called bureaucrvtic
IVQStC~.
Secondly, he assumes that the managers of a profit organization have the ambition
to reach a level of profit above the required minimal level. The utility of the
managers is positively related with the "proud" derived from the excess profit.
Translated to the non-profit organization with its non-distribution constraint, it
seems reasonable to replace the "profit-ambition" by the aim to produce as much
output as possible.
To summarize, the utility function of the bureaucrat in the Williamson model
depends not only on "staff expenses" but also on "output". So, the utility
maximizing problem of the bureaucrat of the non-profit organization is given by:
where
Max Vy - Max V(st,q) (4)
Vw - Utility of the bureaucrat in Williamson's Model
St - Staff expenses
q- output of the non-profit organization
7iae Mique-Belmr,ger Made!
The Niskanen model contains an inconsistency which was first noted by Mique ác
Belanger. First of all, in situations where the budget-function and the cost-
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functions intersect before the budget-function reaches iu maximum, the authors
prove:
' . In Niskaneds model, budget mari'.,i~ar;oa is equivalent to output
mairim'uation with the bureau's budget constraint .. . '(Mique 8t Belanger, 1974, p.
29).
Next, they prove that budget or output maxirn~~ation will be reached only if the
production of the non-profit organization is efficient. So if the bureaucrats are to
maximize the budget, only real necessary expenses can be made. This gives the
strange situation that there may be no slack in the organization in order to achieve
the ultimate goal, i.e. that there is money for elements like salary, status, power.
Or, to put it in another way, the bureaucrats maximize their budget to spend some
money on the mentioned elements, but, at the same time, they only reach this ma-
ximum if they don't spend any money on these elements. This inconsistency is con-
firmed by Niskanen in an article at 1975. Mique 8t Belanger concluded that output
or budget is not the only argument in the utility function of the bureaucrats.
In the Mique-Belanger model, the utility function contains besides output also
slack as a argument. This slack is equal to the 'bureaucratic waste" of Williamson's
model, but in contrast with Williamson, these authors do not specify this element.
They only deóne slack as the difference between the budget and the minimum
necessary costs of production. So, the utility maacimizing problem of the bureaucrat
of the non-profit organization is now given by:
Max V~„b- Max V~„b(S,q)
where
V,,,,b - Utility of the bureaucrat of Mique-Belanger's Model
S - Slack (Budget - Minimum Costs)
q - output of the non-profit organization
(5)
4.1. Conclusion
Niskanen specificies the utility function of the bureaucrat to depend only on
budget or output, but both Williamson and Mique-Belanger make it reasonable to
introduce a second argument (bureaucratic waste) in this utility function. While
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Williamson models this bureaucratic waste by the preference for larger than requi-
red expenses for the staff function, the Mique-Belanger model is more general
where it uses the term "slack". Given the inconsistenry of Niskanen's model and
the more restrictive specification of Williamson, we choose the Mique-Belanger
model as most suitable for defining the utility function of the management of the
non-profit organization (V):
Max V - Max V(S,q) (6)
An important shortcoming at all these modeLs is the budget function. Each model
specifies a single function for the budget, whereas other specifications are not
studied. Therefore, it will be interesting to study the effects on the behaviour of
the managers of the non-profit organization, caused by a change in the structure of
the budget. If the reactions of these managers are different under several types of
budget constraints, it is useful for the government to determine which structure
will optimize its own utility function. The next section studies the relation
government vs. non-profit organization in greater detail.
5. Agency-theory
5.1. Introduction
A main stream of literature within the economic theory of the organization, is
formed by the agency-theory. 'Tltis theory studies the contractual relation between
two parties, the principal and the agent. A characteristic feature of this relation is
the delegation of authority to the agent, whose actions will influence the utiliry of
the principal. If both parties are utility maximizers, it is reasonable to suppose the
agent will not always act in the best interest of the principal. In this agency-
paradigm, information plays an important role. When the principal has imperfect
information about the "state of nature", the agent has the posibility to act in his
own interest, which can be suboptimal for the principal.
The agency-theory assumes that the result of the actions of the agent depends on
the agent's effort and of the "state of nature". The most important instrument for
the principal to guide the agent is the contractual relation between two parties.
Sharing the risk between principal and agent depends on their attitudes towards
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risk and on the information that is available to the principal. The principal must
provide incentives for the agent to make choices which will maximize the
principal's utility.
SZ. The role o[ budgeting
Agency-theory stresses the role of the contract in the principal-agent-relation. The
contract determines the "scope of action" for the agent, which together with the
"state of nature" influences the utiliry of the principal. The contract between the
government (principal) and the bureaucrats of the non-profit organization (agents)
is formed by the .sbuctiuie of tlu bucfg~t. This underlines the important role of
budgeting in the relation government vs. non-profit organization.
We concluded that the utility function of the bureaucrau, based on the three
models of section 4, has two arguments, output (q) and slack (S), which can't
directly be determined by the govemment. The second argument (S) is defined as
the difference between the budget (B) and the minimal costs (C), both depending
on the output (q). The minimum costs (C) must be seen as a normative variable
which is exogenous to the government. Therefore, the slack (S) is the result of the
endogenous budget (B) and the exogenous costs (C). The budget can be
influenced by the government by choosing the structure of the budget.
The govemment can choose different forms of budgeting the non-profit organi-
zation. The budget structure must be choosen such, that on the one hand the non-
profit organization will fïnd it worthwhile to produce the output, but that on the
other hand overprodurtion is avoided. In our model, we specify a budget function
which is formed by a fixed and a variable part. As usually, the first part is
independent of the level of production of the non-profit organization, the output
(q), whereas the second part is modelled as a lineair relation of production. Let us
define the parameter F as the fixed lump-sum fee and the parameter K as a
constant fee for each unit of output, then the budget function to the non-profit
organization, B(q), can be expressed as:
B(q) - F t K q (~)
This budget function describes a budget range from totally fixed to totally variable.
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If the parameter K is zero, the budget is called a ávnpsum inputbudget, whereas a
outputbuc~g~et is given by a budget structure with F equal to zero. If both para-
meters are positive (F ~ 0, K~ 0), the combination is called a mire.d budget.
These different kinds of budget structures represent the dilemma of the govern-
ment by weighting out stimulation of the performance against the risk of overpro-
duction (which implies an excessive growth of the budget). A lump-sum inputbud-
get guarantees the government a fuced budget volume (no risk), but it doesn't
stimulate the non-profit organization to product at all, because extra production
has no budget effect. On the other hand, outputbudgeting stimulates the produc-
tion of the non-profit organization enormously, but the government looses control
over its budget, because each unit must be financed. Both aspects are relevant for
the mixed combinations in varying degrees. As shown in section 3.3, the utiliry
function of the government (U) has both output and budget as its arguments. The
goal function of the government is given by:
Max U - Max U(q,B) (8)
subject to
Max V - Max V(q,S)
B(q) - F f K.q
The government must choose that kind of combination of F and K that maximizes
their own utility function. The optimal combination is given by [F~, K~].
Conctusiarc: The agency-theory stresses the role of the contract in a principal-
agent relation. To guide the bureaucrats of the non-profit organization, the
government can use the structure of the budget in different ways. An outputbudget
is very stimulating to the production of the non-profit organization but it implies
an uncontrolled budget volume for the government. A lump-sum inputbudget has
just the opposite consequences.
6. Budgeting with perfect foresight
6.1. Introduction
In this section we study the effects of the structure of budgeting by the government
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on the behaviour of the non-profit organization. First of all, we study this
behaviour in the situation the government has perfect foresight. In that case, the
government exactly knows both the utility function of the bureaucrats of the non-
proFit organization (V) and the minimum cost function (C) of this organization. In
the case of imperfect information, the government is confronted with uncertainty
with respect to these functions. Both situations, perfect and imperfect foresight by
the government, will be studied using two forms of budgeting, the lump-sum
inputbudget and the outputbudget, which characterize the both extremes of the
budget function. Firstly, we will study the process whereby the government uses a
lump-sum inputbudget, followed by an enunciation of the behaviour of the
government in the case of outputbudgeting.
6Z. Lump-sum inputbudgeting
The budget equation in the case of an inputbudget, B; is given by
'-F (9)
The government chooses a level of F, which yields the maximum utility and de-
pends on the behaviour of the bureaucrats at the non-profit organization. There-
fore, we study this behaviour at some levels of F. The cost function C(q)
represents the minimum costs for the non-profit organization which are exogenous
to the government. Figure 3 shows the cost function C(q) and three different
levels of the inputbudget. These budgets, once determined, are independent of the
output q and therefore represented by a straight, horizontal line.
Next, it it possible to construct the slack as a function of q in the situation of a
lump-sum inputbudget. The slack (S' ) was defined as the difference between the
budget (F) and the cost C(q). Given the specification of the inputbudget, this
relation is given by:
S~(q) - F - C(q) - - - - ~ F - S'(q) } C(q) (10)
q - q(F) (11)











Figure 3: Dift'erent levels of an inputbudget
the non-profit organization as shown in equation (11). In figure 3, three different
levels of F are drawn, which result in three curves of S' (q) which are shown in
figure 4(S1, S2 and S3).
Output
Figure 4: The Slack-Expansion-Path (SEP) in the case of inputbudgeting
Next, it is possible to construct some indifference curves of the bureaucrats in the
non-profit organization. In section 4, have already concluded that the utility
function of these bureaucrats has two arguments, output and slack. Given the axes
of figure 4, with output on the horizontal and slack on the vertical axis, it it
possible to add some of these indifference curves to the figure. As a consequence
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of the characteristics of concavity of the utility function, these indifference curves
are convex to the origins. Figure 4 shows the slackcurves S'(q) that are concave to
the orgin. So, each of these slackcurves must have a point of tangency with an
indifference curve. By connecting these points of tangency, we get a path which
represents the set of optimal combinations [q,S] for the non-profit organization. A
possible form of this path is given in figure 4, which will be called the "Slack-
expansion-path" [SEPJ. Given the cost function of the non-profit organization and
the utility function of the bureaucrats, the SEP shows the optimal combinations
[q,SJ to the bureaucrau at each level of F. This expansion path is given by:
SEP' - SEP'((q',S[q'])) (12)
- SEP'(q')
So, the SEP' is a funtion of q', which is determined by the level of F. Next, it is
possible to determine the necessary volume of the budget for each level of output.
This budget volume is equal to the sum of the realized slack and the minimum
cost of producing a certain level of output. The relation between the output and
the corresponding budget will be called the 'budget-expansion-path" (BEP). In
equation forms, the BEP for inputbudgeting is equal to
BEP' - C(q' ) t SEP(q' ) (13)
- h(q~)
Figure 5 shows an example of the cost function, the SEP and the BEP, which illu-
strates that even with perfect foresight, the government must pay the non-profit
organization a budget that is higher than the minimum cost. The difference
between these two curves, represented by the SEP' (q' ), is a good measure for the
level of inefficiency.
In order to define an expression for the relation as given in the first quadrant of
figure 2, it is necessary to determine the imerse r~elation of equation (10).
q' - h'~(BEP') (14)
S See Deaton and Muellbauer, Econa~nica cnd Corisumo BrJ~aviour, p. 30.
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Output
Figure 5: The BEP as sum of the SEP and the cost function
This BEP represents the consequent budget ( F) necessary to produce some level
of output. Therefore, equation ( 14) can be written as
- q(F) (15)
which is equal to equation (11). This relation, which shows the output (q) as a
function of the budget-volume, is called the "output-expansion-path" (OEP) and
represents the realized output by the non-profit organization for each level of
budget. As will be known, this relation depends on the cost function of the non-
profit organization, the utility function of the bureaucrats of the non-profit
organization and the budget structure, which is determined by the government.
The objective function of the government, as shown by equation (8), is now
specified by:
Max U - Max U(q',F)
F
subject to




Because the government knows these relations, ít chooses that level of F that
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maximize its own goal: F~.
6.3. Outputbudgeting
Instead of the fixed sum F, the budget equation in the case of outputbudgeting is
given by:
Bo(N - Kq (17)
The number of units produced by the non-profit organization is financed by a
constant fee (K). The government chooses the level of K which yields the
maximum utility. Figure 6 shows some budgetlines in relation with the cost
function C(q). These budgetlines are represented by straight lines by which the
level of K determines the tangenry of the budgetlines.
Output
Figure 6: Different levels of an ouputbudget
Once the budget function is determined, the framework used in the inputbudgeting
case, can again be applied. First of all, it is possible to determine the slack at each
budget level. The curves of the slack function yield, together with the isoquants of
the utility function of the bureaucrats, the SEP. Figure 7 illustrates this graphically.
I~1ext, we can construct, in the same way as the inputbudgeting case, the BEP as
sum of the cost function and the SEP. Analogous to the expansion-path in the case
18
Output
Figure 7: The slack~xpansion-path in the case o[ outputbudgeting
inputbudgeting, the BEPo can be written as a function of K which results in an
output-expansion-path as a function of the level of K:
qo - q(K) (18)
The objective of the government is now given by
Max U - Max U(qo,K)
K
subject to
Max V - Max V(q,S)
B(q) - K.qo
qo - q(K)
The government chooses that level of K(q) that maximize its own goal: K'.
(19)
6.4. Conclusion
In section 6, the relation corresponding to the "function" given in the first quadrant
of figure 2 has been specified for both input- and outputbudgeting. From the
equations (15) and (18), we can conclude that the behaviour of the bureaucrats of
the non-profit organization is influenced by the choice of the budget function. The
OEP's of the mixed budget structures can be determined in the same way. The
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government will choose the combination [F~ ,K~ ] that optimize its own utility,
which is equivalent to the choice of budget structure that will yield the highest
OEP.
In the case of perfect foresight, the government simultaneously will determine the
optimal level of the output and of the budget volume. Therefore, the OEP's
corresponding to the different budget structures can be compared at the same
budget level. At every budget volume, the government can determine the level of
output for each budget structure. The structure which will yield the government
the highest output will be optimal for the government, and thus be chosen.
7. Imperfect foresight
7.1. Introduction
It seems more reasonable to assume that the government doesn't have perfect
information at the cost function of the non-profit organization and the utility
function of the bureaucrats. The government lcnows it can over- or underestimate
the position of the OEP's, so it is confronted with a bandwidth of OEP's in stead
of some clear defined paths. In this section we will study the consequences of im-
perfect foresight for both input and outputbudgeting.
7.2. Lump-sum inputbudgeting
Figure 8 shows the situation of imperfect foresight for the inputbudgeting case. In
stead of one OEP, there are three paths which represent the range of possibili-
ties. First of all, the government estimates the OEP which in combination with the
marginal utility function of output (dU `, top left), the marginal disutility function
of the budget (dU-, down right) and the condition of optimality (dU `- dU",
down left), yields us the optimal level of output (q' ) and budget (B' ). The real
budgetline, B~, is therefore equal to the estimated optimal budget B~.
Because the government only has imperfect information, it is possible that the
realized expansion-path is positioned above the estimated path. In figure 8, this
situation is represented by path A. In that case, the government receives more
output at the same budget than she expected to receive, which results in a higher





Figure 8: Inputbudgeting in the case of imperfect foresight to the
corresponding budget BA that would be optimal at this output level, determined
by the optimality condition in the third quadrant, it it clear that this situation is
not optimal. The budget BA is not equal to the realized budget B~, implying that
marginal utility and marginal disutility are not equal. To optimize its utility, the
government should lower its budget somewhere between BA en B~. Although, the
utility of the government is now higher then at the estimated situation, it doesn't
represent the optimal situation.
Just the opposite holds for the lower path B. The lower output qe results in the
discrepancy between the actual budget B~ and the corresponding higher budget
BB The government should expand their budget to receive the optimal situation
but this is prevented by the lump-sum inputbudget.
Conclurion If the OEP is higher then expected, the government receives a higher
level of output at the same budget level. Therefore, the utility of the government
increases, but is suboptimal because of the discrepancy between the marginal
utility of output and the marginal disutility of the budget. To optimize the utility,
the government would ex post like to lower its budget, but this is prevented by the
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system of an ex ante fixed lump-sum-budgeting. For a lower OEP the conclusions
are just reversed.
73. Outputbudgeting
In the case of outputbudgetíng, the government chooses the K that optimizes its
utility level. This fee is chosen such that the budgetline and the estimated OEP cut
each other in the optimal combination of q and B, which are represented by q'




'~ ~ ' .
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Figure 9: Outputbudgeting in the case of imperfect foresight
We begin by studying the consequences of the situation in which the real path lies
above the estimated one. In contrast with the case of inputbudgeting, not only the
level of output is affected, but also the budget volume. The higher expansion-
path, path C in figure 9, results in the outputlevel q~ and the real budget volume
B~R. The outputlevel q~, which is higher then the (estimated) optimal output q',
corresponds to a marginal utility of output of dU~' . Given the optimality
condition, the optimum would be reached if the marginal disutility of budget
would equal dU~, which would result in a budget volume of B~. Because B~Rand
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B~ differ, represented by triangle C, the realized budget B~R in the situation of
path C is suboptimal. In this situation, both the positive and the negative part of
the utility function increases, so it is not clear whether the utility of the
government increases or decreases in contrast with the estimated situation. But, it
is clear that to optimize its utility, the government should decrease the budget
somewhere between Bcand BcRby lowering the fee (K').
The results of a lower e~cpansion-path, path D, are just opposite to the ones
corresponding to path C. The realized budget is given by BpR, while the budget
which is optimal to the output qp is given by Bp. Both the positive and the
negative part of the utilïty function are decreased, whereas the government must
increase its budget to optimize its utility.
7.4. Conclusion
Imperfect information with respect to both the cost function of the non-profit
organization and the utility function of the bureaucrats, results in a bandwidth of
OEP's in stead of one clear defined path. Table 1 shows the consequences to both
the positive and the negative part of the utility function, the consequences to the
total utility and the preference of the government with respect to the budget.
Mutations
Ut U- U dB
Higher OEP, Inputmodel t 0 t -
Higher OEP, Outputmodel t t 1 -
Lower OEP, Inputmodel - 0 - f
Lower OEP, Outputmodel - - ? t
Table 1: Consequences of the higher and lower OEP's in the case of imperfect
information
The comparison of the different expansion-paths is more difficult then in the case
of perfect foresight, where the government compared these paths at the same
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budget level. When the government has imperfect information, this is no longer
possible, so that it is unclear which budget structure maximimizes the utility of the
government. The government is confronted with uncertainty to both output and
budget.
8. The Mathematical Model
8.1. Introduction
In the last two sections, we discussed the role of budgeting in the relation
government vs. non-profit organization. Until now, the analysis is mainly
descriptive. In this section, we present a model which further analyses the
described theory, in order to conclude which budget structure will be optimal for
the government. Because of the extensiveness of the modelb only the main
features are presented.
8.2. Modeling the situation of perfect foresight
The utility function of the government (U) can be given by:
Max U - Max (U' - U-)
a
subject to
V- Max V(q,s) S~ 0, q~ 0
where
(20)
U } - ~ln(q) with ~ ~ 0 (21)
U' - t e~~ with rr ,~ ~ 0 (22)
As shown earlier, the utility function is represented by the difference of the
positive and the negative part. The argument of the positive part of the utility
function is output. As related in section 3.2., this part of the utility function is
specified to be concave and increasing in its argument. The negative part of the
utility function depends on the disutility of the tax payments. The relation between
the disutility and the tax payments is assumed to be convex and increasing in its
' The mathematical model will be the main part of my dissertatioq "Budgeting the non-profit organi-
zations: An agency-theoretic approach" (in Dutch), forthcoming 1991.
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argument.
In section 6.4, we have concluded that the government can perfectly determine the
level of output and the budget volume simultaneously. Therefore, the government
can compare each budget structure given a certain budget volume'. We introduce
the parameter a which determines the relative proportion of the fixed part of the
budget. The budget function is specified by:
B(q) - a F t(1-a )Kq with 0 s a s 1 (23)
The relation between output and budget, q- q(B), as given in the first quadrant
of figure 2, can't be derived until the utility function of the bureaucrats and the
cost function of the non-profit organization are specified. The economic models of
bureaucrary assume that the utility function of the bureaucrats (V) depends on
both output and slack. We assume that the utility is concave and increasing in
both output and slack. The utility function is given by:
V(S,q) - xln(S[q]) t yln(q) with x~ 0, y~ 0 (24)
The utility function of the bureacrats of the non-profit organization is defined as
the sum of both the arguments. To determine the relative influence of both
arguments, we define a as the quotient of [x~(xty)]. So, it is possible to write the
utility function of the bureaucrats as:
Max V - Max V(q,S)
- Max {a ln(S[q]) t (1-Q )In(q)} (25)
Next, we must define the cost function of the non-profit organization. The cost
function is assumed to be convez, containing both a fixed part and a variable part
which depends on the outputvolume. The cost function is given by:
C(q) - ao f alq t a2q2 with ao, a!, aZ ~ 0 (26)
' At each possible budget volume.
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From section 6.2, we know that slack (S[q]) is defined as the difference between
the budget (B[qJ) and the cost (C[q]) at each outputlevel. Given these equations,
we can specify the utility function of the bureaucrats by:
V - aln[aFf(1-a)Kq-ao-alqfaZq2] t (1-Q).ln(q) (27)
In equation (27), the bureaucrats can only choose the level of output (q), because
the other parameters (F,K, o, ao , al and az ) are exogenous to the bureaucrats.
The utility function (V) is maximized by the value of q for which the first-order
condition is equal to zero.
dV Q [(1-a)K-al -2a2q] (1-Q )
- t - 0 (28)
dq [aF't(1-a)Kq-ao -alqfaZq2] Q
which result in the following specification of the OEP:




Equation (29) represents the mathematical expression of the OEP of the first
quadrant of figure 2. T'his equation is the result of the utility maximizing
behaviour of the bureaucrats, which can be used by the government to determine
the optimal combination [F,K].
83. Optimal Choice
As the government knows the expression of the OEP, she can use this in order to
optimize her own objective. The utility function of the government is specified by
~.{aF- f (1-a)Kq}
Max U - Max [~ln(q) - ~ e ] (3p)
F, K
In the case of perfect foresight, the government can determine exactly the optimal
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level of the output and of the budget volume. Therefore, it is possible to compare
the utility of the government for each budget structure at the smne budget vo[ume,
which implies that the second part of equation (30) is equal for each combination
[F,KJ. Therefore, the utility of the government is maximized by the budget
structure which yields the highest output. T'he expression of the OEP is given at
equation (29). The optimal budget structure is defined by the specification of the
parameter s. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the first-order condition of
the OEP with respect to s(see Appendix A). Because ultimately, the parameter s
dces not appear in the first-order condition, the restriction on ~ implies a boun-
dary solution. Further analysis (see appendix A) makes clear that, ceteris paribus,
the output is maximized at a value of s- 0 which is equal to an outputbudget.
Conclurion: Give~t t1u made! specificatio~ outputbudgeting marunizer the utilily of
tht gnvP,rnment in the siámtion of perfeá infannation
9. Imperfect foresight: a simulation model
9.1. Introduction
Usually, the government contracts out the production to the non-profit
organization, whithout having perfect information about the utility function of the
bureaucrats and the cost function of the non-profit organization. In section 7, we
demonstrated that this imperfect foresight results in a bandwidth of the OEPs
instead of one well-defined path. This implies that it is not clear what the exact
effects are for the utility function of the government and in what proportion the
different budget systems bear to one another. In this section, we will, using the
model of section 8, compare the models of budgeting in the case of imperfect
information.
9.2. Expected Utility Theory
In the case of imperfect information, the government is confronted with decision
making under uncertainty. The well-known theory which is often used in this kind
of situation, is the "expected utility theory". Halter and Dean say:
'I'ée theory and rationale for using the maximum expected value of utility as a
general criterioa of choice in decision making under uncertaint~I', ( Halter and
Dean, 1972, p. 32)
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The expected utility seems to be a good measure of the behaviour of the govern-
ment in decision making under uncertainty, because it incorporates not only the
expected value of output but also the variability of this output. Therefore, the risk
attitude of the government is correlated with the shape of the utility function.
Varian (1984) and Halter and Dean (1971) prove that concavity of the expected
utility function is equivalent to risk aversion. Formally, it can't be proved that the
government function in our model is concavee But, given the shape of both the
positive and the negative part (as a function of q) of the utility function and the
fact that they intersect9 it follows that the utility function is concave, which ís
equivalent with a risk aveis government.
Next, we should determine the expected value of the utility function of the
government. Now, the goverment is confronted with the stochastic output q, which
is attended with an enor term ~. The expected value of the utility function can
only be assesed if we specify a probability distribution of the error term. But, even
if we take a simple probability function like the uniform distribution, it is
impossible to get an expression of the budget structure which yields some clear
results. Therefore, a possible way to gain an insight into decision making under
uncertainty is a model which simulates this process.
9.3. Simulation
The simulation model is based on the model of section 8 and tries to incorporate
the behaviour of the government under uncertainty. 1"herefore, the parameter of
the utility function of the bureaucrats and the parameters of the cost function of
the non-profit organization are assumed to be stochastic. We will test the next
nul-hypothesis:
Ho: Tiu utility fundion of the gavernment in deeision mal~tg wrder wtcen~nty
is dways mazimized by outputbudgetin,~
Hw- The utilitY function oÍ the gr~vverr~nent in decirion malfdrtg tutder uncertainty
is not always matvnizPd by outputbudgetin~
"A func[ion witb two arguments, F' and K', satisfies the definition of concavity, only if the matru of
second derivatives is non-negative definite. A bC2-matru satisfies this condition if the diagnonal
elements are negative and the produd of these elements minus the product of the non-diagonal
elements is positive.
' If both curves don't intersed the output level is zero or infinite, which is assumed to be impossible.
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Using a simulation model has a lot of restrictions with respect to the conclusions.
It is, for instance, impossible to conclude that one way of budgeting would a[ways
be the best. Therefore, we only may conclude that we can't reject the Ho -
hypothesis at the studied situation or that we must reject the Ho -hypothesis in
favour of the HA-hypothesis.
1fie results of the simulation process, as given in appendix C, are clear. Firstly, the
expected value of the utility of the government decreases for every combination
[F,K] if the uncertainty increases. Secondly, the results show that outputbudgeting
will not always be optimal to the government. T'he expected value of the utility
using outputbudgeting will frequently be lower than the value obtained applying a
mixed budget. When the uncertainty increases, the optimal model shifs more and
more in the direction of the mixed models with a relative higher fixed part of the
budget.
Concásriac Incnoasvtg uncartainty rrsults in a shift towards a budget with a bigger
ftzed compo~teitt io
10. Summary and Conclusions
This paper studied the relation between the government and the non-profit
organization from an agency theoretic perspective. This theory stresses the role of
the budget structure in the relation between these two parties. The main goal was
to study how to maximize the social welfare function of the government, when the
production was contracted out to the non-profit organization.
We started by studying the theories of "Public Finance" and "Welfare Economics",
in order to determine an utility function of the government. The theories of Pigou,
Pareto and Bergson were enuciated. These models resulted in an utility function of
the government in which both the utility of output and the disutility of the budget
are incorporated.
Secondly, contracting out the production resulted in sharing the risk between
principal and agent. The results of this process depend on the risk attitude of both
'o Only at a very small level of uncertainty, outputbudgeting may be optimal. This is not suprising,
because at such a uncertainty level the model can óardly be distinguished from the model under
certainty.
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parties and of the kind of information the principal has. The principal must
provide incentives for the agent to make choices in a way that will maximize the
principals utility. To determine the utility function of the agent (- bureaucrat), the
economic models of bureaucray of Niskanen, Williamson and Mique 8c Belanger
were studied, which implied an utility function of the bureaucrats which depends
on both output and slack.
The budget structure was defined as a function which ranges of totally variable
(outputbudgeting) to totally fixed (lump-sum inputbudgeting) with mixed models in
between. The results of different forms of budgeting to the maximization process
of the government were described, both in the case of perfect and imperfect
foresight to the government.
Finally, we presented the model which represents these theories and tried to
optimize the utility function of the government. The results of this model are
clear: the utility function of the government in decision making under perfect
foresight is always maximized by outputbudgeting, whereas the simulation model,
based on the ma~cimization of the expected value of utility as a criterion of
decision making under uncertainty, makes clear that the government can better
choose a mixed model in the case of imperfect information. Greater uncertainty
will result in a higher proportion of the fixed part in the total budget.
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Appendix A
The output (q) is maximized by the value of a for which the first-order condition
is equal to zero. This gives:




Equation (A.1) is equal to zero only if:





Kz{(a-1)Kfal}2 - 4aZFK(1-a2){(a-1)Ktal} f 4a2F2(1-az)2 (A.3)
This can be written as:
KZ(F-ao) - F[Ka~ - FaZ(1-QZ)] - 0 (A.4)
Because the parameter a does not appear in equation (A.4), the restriction on a
implies a boundary solution. An example ( see appendix B) yields that the output
will be maacimized at a level of a- 0, which is equal to outputbudgeting. At the
same budget volume, this budgeting structure yields the highest utiliry to the
government. In appendix B(table B.2., columm U[perfect]), it can be seen that in
the case of perfect information, the utility of the government at a system of
outputbudgeting ( combination 1) is higher than at each other system.
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Appendix B
Values: K(ao) - 7.500.000 s- 1,5 ' 10"'
w(a 1) - 1.500 T- 1000
~ (aZ) - 8 ~ - 20
k(a) - 0,4
Variation coefficient of a; - o (a; )~K (a; ) is ihe same for all parameters. Table
B.1 shows two possible simulations for the government.
Simulat. Variation a(a0) o(al) a(a2) o(a)
coefficient
1 3,OX 225.000 54 0,24 0,0122 B,OX 600.000 136 0,64 0,032
Table B.l: Values at two possible simulations
The budget combinations [K,F] are determined gíven the values of the parameters.
Firstly, the government chooses the level of K that optimizes its utility function
(with F- 0). This results in a level of K- 17.497 and a utility of 6631,66. Next,
the same is done the case of inputbudgeting (K - 0). Finally, two mixed models
are determined with resp. F- 2.500.000 and F- 12.500.000, whereafter the
corresponding K that optimizes the utility of the government is determined. The
resulting utilities are shown in tabel B.2 [U(perfect)]. Secondly, we determine the
utility of each combination for simulation 1 and 2.
Comb. K F U(perfect) Simulat. 1 Simulat. 2
1 17.497 0 6631,66 4553,06 3981,21
2 15.777 2.500.000 6589,20 6572,18 6117,53
3 7.979 12.500.000 6393,57 6393,27 6392,09
4 0 18.672.400 6218,25 6218,11 6217,66
Table B1: Results of the simulation model
The result show that for simulation 1 the expected utility of the government is
maximized at combination 2, whereas for simulation 2 combination 3 is optimal.
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